Previously, on JoshCamson.com
- In Honor of Presidents’ Day
- Legal Ethics Tip: Don’t Fabricate Your Job History
- Great New Legal Humor Website
- The Importance of Clarity
My Writings Around the Internet
- Legal Ethics Tip: Don’t Fabricate Your Job History February 15, 2010
- Dating a Lawyer February 14, 2010
- Podcast Ipsa Loquitur: Branding, Twitter Apathy, and Sexting February 9, 2010
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Archive for the ‘Legal’ Category
Legal Ethics Tip: Don’t Fabricate Your Job History
February 15th, 2010
New website CareerExcuses.com allows people to fill their resume with fake information. The website will give you an 800 number, e-mail address, and contact person to list as a reference. Whenever someone calls the number, a live operator will answer, and can take a message. Quite elaborate! They even offer some legal advice:
Is misinformation on a resume illegal?
No, Since a resume is not a legal document, it is not illegal to misrepresent on a resume.
While it may not be illegal, it is certainly unethical, so that’s why today’s legal ethics tip is: don’t fabricate your job history.
New website CareerExcuses.com allows people to fill their resume with fake information. The website will give you an 800 number, e-mail address, and contact person to list as a reference. Whenever someone calls the number, a live operator will answer, and can take a message. Quite elaborate! They even offer some legal advice:
Is misinformation on a resume illegal?
No, Since a resume is not a legal document, it is not illegal to misrepresent on a resume.
While it may not be illegal, it is certainly unethical, so that’s why today’s legal ethics tip is: don’t fabricate your job history.
Tags: ethics, fake careers, jobs
Posted in Legal | Comments (1)
California Bill Would Require Witnesses to Report Violent Crimes
December 19th, 2009
Assemblymember Pedro Nava (D-Santa Barbara) announced a proposed amendment to California’s criminal code. The amendment would require witnesses to violent crimes to report the incident to police. Failure to report the crime could result in up to six months in jail and a fine of $1,500.
The current California law requires witnesses to report crimes against children under the age of 14. The amendment comes in the wake of a violent rape of a 16 year old girl in October. Authorities say that up to a dozen people watched the incident, but nobody called the police.
Assemblymember Pedro Nava (D-Santa Barbara) announced a proposed amendment to California’s criminal code. The amendment would require witnesses to violent crimes to report the incident to police. Failure to report the crime could result in up to six months in jail and a fine of $1,500.
The current California law requires witnesses to report crimes against children under the age of 14. The amendment comes in the wake of a violent rape of a 16 year old girl in October. Authorities say that up to a dozen people watched the incident, but nobody called the police.
Tags: California, punishment, violent crime
Posted in Legal | Comments (1)
Florida: Judges Cannot be Facebook Friends with Litigants
December 9th, 2009
Florida’s Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee responded to a few questions from one Florida judge about the use of social networking sites. The Committee found that judges cannot accept friend requests from litigants in their court. They take special care to note:
This opinion should not be interpreted to mean that the inquiring judge is prohibited from identifying any person as a “friend” on a social networking site. Instead, it is limited to the facts presented by the inquiring judge, related to lawyers who may appear before the judge. Therefore, this opinion does not apply to the practice of listing as “friends” persons other than lawyers, or to listing as “friends” lawyers who do not appear before the judge, either because they do not practice in the judge’s area or court or because the judge has listed them on the judge’s recusal list so that their cases are not assigned to the judge.
It’s pretty clear from this opinion that accepting a request on Facebook, LinkedIn and Myspace from a litigant in the judge’s court are out. The opinion does not just apply to those sites though:
Although Facebook has been used as an example in this opinion, the holding of the opinion would apply to any social networking site which requires the member of the site to approve the listing of a “friend” or contact on the member’s site, if (1) that person is a lawyer who appears before the judge, and (2) identification of the lawyer as the judge’s “friend” is thereafter displayed to the public or the judge’s or lawyer’s other “friends” on the judge’s or the lawyer’s page.
Any sites with a Facebook-like approach will obviously meet the criteria of this opinion. My question is: what about Twitter? If someone is protected on Twitter, they have to approve all followers. However, anybody can see which followers have been approved. So, does that constitute identification as a “friend” on the judge’s page? I think it very well might.
You can read the full committee opinion, which also discusses campaign committees, here.
Hat tip to the Legal Profession Blog for finding this.
Florida’s Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee responded to a few questions from one Florida judge about the use of social networking sites. The Committee found that judges cannot accept friend requests from litigants in their court. They take special care to note:
This opinion should not be interpreted to mean that the inquiring judge is prohibited from identifying any person as a “friend” on a social networking site. Instead, it is limited to the facts presented by the inquiring judge, related to lawyers who may appear before the judge. Therefore, this opinion does not apply to the practice of listing as “friends” persons other than lawyers, or to listing as “friends” lawyers who do not appear before the judge, either because they do not practice in the judge’s area or court or because the judge has listed them on the judge’s recusal list so that their cases are not assigned to the judge.
It’s pretty clear from this opinion that accepting a request on Facebook, LinkedIn and Myspace from a litigant in the judge’s court are out. The opinion does not just apply to those sites though:
Although Facebook has been used as an example in this opinion, the holding of the opinion would apply to any social networking site which requires the member of the site to approve the listing of a “friend” or contact on the member’s site, if (1) that person is a lawyer who appears before the judge, and (2) identification of the lawyer as the judge’s “friend” is thereafter displayed to the public or the judge’s or lawyer’s other “friends” on the judge’s or the lawyer’s page.
Any sites with a Facebook-like approach will obviously meet the criteria of this opinion. My question is: what about Twitter? If someone is protected on Twitter, they have to approve all followers. However, anybody can see which followers have been approved. So, does that constitute identification as a “friend” on the judge’s page? I think it very well might.
You can read the full committee opinion, which also discusses campaign committees, here.
Hat tip to the Legal Profession Blog for finding this.
Tags: Facebook, Florida, judges, judicial code of conduct, LinkedIn, MySpace, Twitter
Posted in Legal | Comments (0)
Non-profit Files Disciplinary Complaints Against Torture Memo Lawyers
December 2nd, 2009
On November 27th a group of lawyers filed complaints with the Washington, D.C. Board of Professional Responsibility to disbar William Haynes II, John Choon Yoo, and Alberto Gonzales for their participation in the torture memos. Haynes was the former General Counsel for the Department of Defense, while Yoo was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. The group, Velvet Revolution, had already made similar complaints to Boards of Professional Responsibility in DC, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, and New York. Links to all of the complaints are below.
Jay Bybee-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Douglas Feith-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
David Addington-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Stephen Bradbury-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Michael Chertoff-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
John Ashcroft-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Timothy Flanigan-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Alice Fisher-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
William Haynes-California Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
John Yoo- Pennsylvania Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Alberto Gonzales-Texas Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Michael Mukasey-New York Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
William Haynes – District of ColumbiaAdobe Acrobat (.pdf)
John Yoo – District of ColumbiaAdobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Alberto Gonzales – District of ColumbiaAdobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Velvet Revolution argue that these attorneys repeatedly advocated for interrogation techniques in violation of US and international law. The group claims to have over a million members nationally, and represent more than 150 organizations. In addition to disbarring these attorneys, the group hopes to spark an open discussion of torture and how it has been used. Although they don’t necessarily cite to a specific ethical rule in each complaint, the message is clear. Only time and the respective Boards of Professional Conduct will tell whether the complaints have any merit.
On November 27th a group of lawyers filed complaints with the Washington, D.C. Board of Professional Responsibility to disbar William Haynes II, John Choon Yoo, and Alberto Gonzales for their participation in the torture memos. Haynes was the former General Counsel for the Department of Defense, while Yoo was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. The group, Velvet Revolution, had already made similar complaints to Boards of Professional Responsibility in DC, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, and New York. Links to all of the complaints are below.
Jay Bybee-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Douglas Feith-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
David Addington-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)Stephen Bradbury-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Michael Chertoff-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
John Ashcroft-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Timothy Flanigan-District of Columbia Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)Alice Fisher-District of Columbia Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
William Haynes-California Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
John Yoo- Pennsylvania Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Alberto Gonzales-Texas Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)Michael Mukasey-New York Bar Microsoft Word (.doc) Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
William Haynes – District of ColumbiaAdobe Acrobat (.pdf)
John Yoo – District of ColumbiaAdobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Alberto Gonzales – District of ColumbiaAdobe Acrobat (.pdf)
Velvet Revolution argue that these attorneys repeatedly advocated for interrogation techniques in violation of US and international law. The group claims to have over a million members nationally, and represent more than 150 organizations. In addition to disbarring these attorneys, the group hopes to spark an open discussion of torture and how it has been used. Although they don’t necessarily cite to a specific ethical rule in each complaint, the message is clear. Only time and the respective Boards of Professional Conduct will tell whether the complaints have any merit.
Tags: disbarment, legal ethics, torture
Posted in Legal | Comments (2)
Some Thoughts on the Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence
November 17th, 2009
The federal judiciary recently posted a revised version of the Federal Rules of Evidence to solicit comments on the proposed changes. The revisions, overall, are a tremendous improvement over the current rules. They make the rules easier to read and understand. However, while the goal of these re-styled rules is to avoid any changes in meaning, I think some of the proposed changes will result in a change in meaning.
Rule 404
Original Rule
Proposed Revision
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.
We are just looking at the opening clause of Rule 404 here. You’ll notice that the proposed revisions get rid of the phrase “conformity therewith.” In the introductory comments to the revisions, the authors say that they do not want to get rid of any language that is commonly used and understood in reference to certain rules. They give examples like “truth of the matter asserted” in the context of hearsay. I think the phrase “conformity therewith” falls into that category, and it should come back into 404. Its meaning is well settled and understood.
Rule 405(B)
Original Rule
Proposed Revision
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct.
(b) By Specific Instances of Conduct. When a person’s character or character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the character or trait may also be proved by relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.
In the proposed rule 405(b), the authors add the word “relevant” to qualify the “specific instances of the person’s conduct.” Previously, the rule read to allow any specific instances of a person’s conduct. Those instances of conduct would have to prove the trait of character in question. However, they need not necessarily be independently relevant to the case at hand. I think there is a risk of changing the meaning of the rule by inserting the “relevant” qualifier. It could be read to mean that the specific conduct must be relevant to the case at hand. So if the rulemakers want to keep “relevant” in the new rule, perhaps it could read “…may also be proved by specific instances of the person’s conduct, relevant to proving the character or trait.”
Rule 412
Original Rule
Proposed Revision
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim’s reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case:
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior toward the defendant, if offered by the prosecutor or if offered by the defendant to prove consent; and
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.
(2) Civil Cases. In a civil case, the court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. The court may admit evidence of a victim’s reputation only if the victim has placed it in controversy.
As you can see, in Rule 412 the authors removed the term “alleged” that previously qualified “victim.” On my first read-through of the rules, I thought this created a very major change in the rule. However, the new Rule 412(d) reads: “In this rule, “victim” includes an alleged victim. This definition should go at the beginning of the rules with the rest of the definitions. That will make things much clearer.
Rule 608
Original Rule
Proposed Revision
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused’s or the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character for truthfulness.
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.
(c) Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. A witness does not waive the privilege against self-incrimination by testifying about a matter that relates only to a character for truthfulness.
The restyled version of Rule 608 is particularly helpful. The new version is significantly easier to read and follow, and does not change the meaning of the original rule.
Finally, in Rule 801(d)(2), the authors have removed the term “admissions. They explain:
The term “admissions” is confusing because not all statements covered by the exclusion are admissions in the colloquial sense — a statement can be within the exclusion even if it “admitted” nothing and was not against the party’s interest when made. The term “admissions” also raises confusion in comparison with the Rule 804(b)(3) exception for declarations against interest. No change in application of the exclusion is intended.
Removing the word “admissions” from the hearsay rules was also a very good decision. The committee’s note explaining the confusion inherent in the word “admissions” is spot on.
The federal judiciary recently posted a revised version of the Federal Rules of Evidence to solicit comments on the proposed changes. The revisions, overall, are a tremendous improvement over the current rules. They make the rules easier to read and understand. However, while the goal of these re-styled rules is to avoid any changes in meaning, I think some of the proposed changes will result in a change in meaning.
| Original Rule | Proposed Revision |
| (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: | (a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. |
We are just looking at the opening clause of Rule 404 here. You’ll notice that the proposed revisions get rid of the phrase “conformity therewith.” In the introductory comments to the revisions, the authors say that they do not want to get rid of any language that is commonly used and understood in reference to certain rules. They give examples like “truth of the matter asserted” in the context of hearsay. I think the phrase “conformity therewith” falls into that category, and it should come back into 404. Its meaning is well settled and understood.
| Original Rule | Proposed Revision |
| (b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct. | (b) By Specific Instances of Conduct. When a person’s character or character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the character or trait may also be proved by relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct. |
In the proposed rule 405(b), the authors add the word “relevant” to qualify the “specific instances of the person’s conduct.” Previously, the rule read to allow any specific instances of a person’s conduct. Those instances of conduct would have to prove the trait of character in question. However, they need not necessarily be independently relevant to the case at hand. I think there is a risk of changing the meaning of the rule by inserting the “relevant” qualifier. It could be read to mean that the specific conduct must be relevant to the case at hand. So if the rulemakers want to keep “relevant” in the new rule, perhaps it could read “…may also be proved by specific instances of the person’s conduct, relevant to proving the character or trait.”
| Original Rule | Proposed Revision |
| (a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual predisposition. (b) Exceptions. (1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules: (A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and (C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. (2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim’s reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim. |
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition. (b) Exceptions. (1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: (A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior toward the defendant, if offered by the prosecutor or if offered by the defendant to prove consent; and (C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. (2) Civil Cases. In a civil case, the court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. The court may admit evidence of a victim’s reputation only if the victim has placed it in controversy. |
As you can see, in Rule 412 the authors removed the term “alleged” that previously qualified “victim.” On my first read-through of the rules, I thought this created a very major change in the rule. However, the new Rule 412(d) reads: “In this rule, “victim” includes an alleged victim. This definition should go at the beginning of the rules with the rest of the definitions. That will make things much clearer.
| Original Rule | Proposed Revision |
| (a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. |
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: (1) the witness; or (2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about. (c) Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. A witness does not waive the privilege against self-incrimination by testifying about a matter that relates only to a character for truthfulness. |
The restyled version of Rule 608 is particularly helpful. The new version is significantly easier to read and follow, and does not change the meaning of the original rule.
Finally, in Rule 801(d)(2), the authors have removed the term “admissions. They explain:
The term “admissions” is confusing because not all statements covered by the exclusion are admissions in the colloquial sense — a statement can be within the exclusion even if it “admitted” nothing and was not against the party’s interest when made. The term “admissions” also raises confusion in comparison with the Rule 804(b)(3) exception for declarations against interest. No change in application of the exclusion is intended.
Removing the word “admissions” from the hearsay rules was also a very good decision. The committee’s note explaining the confusion inherent in the word “admissions” is spot on.
Tags: admissibility, character evidence, evidence, hearsay, revisions
Posted in Legal | Comments (1)
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